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THE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH CARE: TIME FOR
A CHANGE?
Benjamin D. Gehlbach*
I. INTRODUCTION
In March of 2010, President Obama signed into law the Affordable Care
Act (the ACA),' continuing the debate on health care reform that embroiled
the nation for over a year prior to the bill's passage and continues to this
day. Upon the bill's signing, Vice President Joseph Biden famously
proclaimed, "[t]his is a big f---ing deal." Critics, on the other hand,
denounced its passage as "abandoning our founding principle that
government governs best when it governs closest to the people,"4 and have
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thank all of his family and friends, especially his fianc6e Lisa Medoro, for all their
support and love. The author would also like to thank everyone from The Journal of
Contemporary Health Law and Policy and Professor Regina Jefferson, for their hard
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1. Health Care Reform was enacted in two parts: the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. 111-149), signed on March 23, 2010, as amended by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (Pub. L. I11-152), signed on March 30,
2010. The Affordable Care Act is the common reference to the product of both pieces of
legislation. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., Understanding the Affordable Care
Act, HEALTHCARE.GOv, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/introduction/index.html (last
visited Jan. 8, 2011).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill,
With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/
health/policy/24health.html.
3. 'A Big F-ing Deal': Biden's Health Care Reform F-Bomb On Live TV,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/23/a-big-
fucking-deal-bidens n 509927.html.
4. Stolberg & Pear, supra note 2.
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vowed to repeal the law in the 112th Congress. Whether people support the
law and the numerous patient protections contained therein, or support the
outright repeal of the bill, one fact cannot be overlooked: with the ACA,
Congress missed an opportunity to correct a flaw in the tax code that favors
employer-provided health insurance over health insurance purchased
elsewhere.
6As a result of changes to the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) in 1954,
employer-provided health insurance, the most prevalent form of health
insurance today,7 receives preferential treatment as compared to health
insurance purchased by an individual privately.8 Section 106 of the Code
allows employees to exclude fully from their adjusted gross income (AGI),
amounts paid by their employer for coverage under an accident or health
plan for the purposes of income and payroll tax liability.9 The average cost
of employer-provided health insurance plans has risen over 120 percent
since 1999, to $4,824 for single coverage and $13,375 for family coverage.1o
5. Lauren Hope Vicary, House Republicans Plan Vote to Repeal 'Obamacare' on
Jan. 12, POLITICS DAILY (Feb. 13, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2011/
01/03/house-republicans-announce-plans-for-vote-to-repeal-obamacare/. The House
recently voted to repeal the ACA, with the Senate not yet acting on this bill as of the date
of publication of this Note. House Republicans Vote to Overturn Obamacare in Symbolic
Move, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/
01/19/house-poised-vote-health-law-repeal/.
6. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contained thousands of changes to the tax
code of 1939, consolidating and clarifying many provisions involving not just the income
tax, but many other taxes as well. See generally FLOYD MORSE HUBBARD, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (1967) (offering a detailed history of
the changes to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2007 19 (Aug. 2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-
235.pdf [hereinafter INCOME, POVERTY]. In 2007, the Census Bureau determined that
nearly 178 million people were covered by employer-provided health insurance,
accounting for 59.3 percent of all individuals. Id.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. 26 U.S.C. §106(a) (2006).
10. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS, 2009 ANNUAL SURVEY 22, 32 (2009), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/
7936-Section_1.pdf (showing that the average cost of single coverage has risen 31
percent since 2004 and over 120 percent since 1999, while family coverage has risen 34
percent and 131 percent over the same periods, respectively).
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This exclusion results in substantial tax savings for individuals and families
with employer-provided coverage.
In contrast, individuals who must purchase their own health insurance
plans outside of the employment context, pay for health insurance with after-
tax dollars that have already been subjected to marginal tax rates as high as
fifty percent.12 It is no surprise then that over sixty percent of Americans
under sixty-five years of age receive health insurance coverage through their
employers.13 In addition to the unequal treatment given to individuals with
non-employer provided health insurance, there are a number of other
criticisms of the preferential status of employer-provided health insurance,
including that the preference exacerbates the phenomena of job lock and
excess insurance, as well as the loss of revenue caused by the exclusion.14
With these criticisms in tow, a number of representatives in Congress, as
well as various outside policy groups, have proposed assorted reforms to the
current system.' 5 Repealing the current exclusion and requiring employees
I1. See generally Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7779.pdf (last visited Jul. 10, 2008).
12. Michael F. Cannon, The Tax Treatment ofHealth Care, CATO HANDBOOK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 141-49 (7th ed. 2009), http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-
14.pdf. Although the top income tax rate is thirty-five percent, the marginal tax rate can
be much higher when considering the Alternative Minimum Tax, the phase-out under
Section 68 of the Code, as well as state and local taxes outside the purview of this Note.
While some may argue that the use of Flexible Spending Accounts (FSA) or Health
Savings Accounts (HSA) mitigates some of this damage by allowing pre-tax dollars to be
used for qualified medical expenses, including the payment of premiums for health
insurance, these types of accounts are now subject to contribution limits under the ACA
that limit their effectiveness to purchase health insurance with pre-tax dollars. For
example, in 2013, the contribution limit for a FSA will be $2,500, while the contribution
limits for HSA's will be $3,050 for individual coverage and $6,150 for family coverage,
not nearly high enough with the average plan costing nearly $5,000 for individual
coverage and nearly $14,000 for family coverage. UNITED HEALTHCARE, Health Reform
and Health Accounts (July 15, 2010), http://www.uhc.com/live/uhccom/Assets/
Documents/FSAHRARetiree.pdf; UNITED HEALTHCARE, Health Reform and Health
Savings Accounts (July 15, 2010), http://www.uhc.com/live/uhc-com/Assets/Documents/
HealthReform_HSA.pdf.
13. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS VOL. 1, CBO BUDGET OPTIONS 5 (Dec.
2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 43-83.
15. For example, during the I10th Congress, seven bills were proposed by a
bipartisan array of senators and congressmen that would eliminate or limit the amount of
400
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to include employer-provided health insurance as part of their AGI is one
proposal to reform the current exclusion.16 Other proposals include capping
the exclusion based on income or the value of the insurance policy,
establishing tax credits, and instituting an excise tax on insurance companies
that offer high-cost insurance plans.17
This Note argues that the current treatment of employer-provided health
insurance is inequitable and needs reform in order to drive down overall
health care costs and to provide revenue for other provisions of the ACA (or
for a replacement, should repeal be successful), or alternatively, to help
bring down the budget deficit. Part 1I examines the history and scope of the
exclusion, as well as the rationales advanced prior to its adoption. Part III
studies criticisms of the exclusion to understand better the weaknesses of the
current system, including job lock, excess insurance, and loss of revenue.
Part IV evaluates some of the proposals for changing the current exclusion,
including those proposed by members of Congress and by outside policy
groups. Some of these proposals include repealing the exclusion, capping
the exclusion based on income or value of the insurance policy, and
providing new tax incentives altogether.'8 Part V argues that the best option
the exclusion to specified amounts. BOB LYKE, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767, THE
TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY ISSUES
REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE 2 n. 4 (2008), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34767_
20081121 .pdf. Outside policy groups from across the political spectrum were very active
in the health care reform debate and proposed a number of different treatments of the
exclusion as well. See, e.g., PAUL VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, LIMITING THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE CAN
HELP PAY FOR HEALTH REFORM (June 4, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-2-09
health.pdf; JASON ROFFENBENDER, HERITAGE FOUND., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CAP TAX BENEFITS CONSISTENTLY (Dec. 5, 2008),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/12/employer-based-health-insurance-why-
congress-should-cap-tax-benefits-consistently; AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS, REFORMING THE
TAX EXCLUSION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2009), http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/
wherewe stand/policy/healthreform tax ex.pdf LISA CLEMANS-COPE, STEPHEN
ZUCKERMAN & ROBERTON WILLIAMS, URBAN INST., CHANGES TO THE TAX EXCLUSION OF
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS: A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF
FINANCING FOR HEALTH REFORM 2 (June 2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411916_tax exclusioninsurance.pdf; STUART M. BUTLER, BROOKINGS INST., EVOLVING
BEYOND TRADITIONAL EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE 7 (May 2007),
http://www.brookings.edu/es/hamilton/200705Butler.pdf; Cannon, supra note 12.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 96-124.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 84-124.
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for reforming this flawed system is to cap the exclusion based on income
and the cost of the insurance plan. A cap on the exclusion would accomplish
the dual objectives of bringing overall health care costs down and providing
necessary revenue to finance other provisions of the ACA or its replacement,
or alternatively, to reduce the deficit. In addition, a cap would not create
some of the drawbacks of the other proposals.1 9
II. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED
HEALTH CARE
A. History and Scope of the Exclusion
A concrete understanding of the history behind the preferential treatment
of employer-provided health insurance is vital when evaluating whether the
same rationales underlying the initial decision for the exclusion still exist
today. Prior to 1954, an employee's AGI included employer-provided
health insurance.20 However, in response to societal pressures and a series
of tax rulings during the period following World War 1I, Congress enacted
I.R.C. § 106(a), excluding employer-provided health insurance from an
employee's AGI.2 1
World War II was one of the main catalysts for the proliferation of
employer-based coverage in America because of the wage controls enacted
by Congress and the Roosevelt Administration during the war.22 The wage
controls, imposed in an effort to stabilize the wartime economy, limited the
salaries that certain industries could pay.23 As a result, employers had an
19. This Note will not focus on the impact to the number of uninsured. For a
discussion on the impact to the uninsured, see Stuart M. Butler, A Tax Reform Strategy to
Deal with the Uninsured, 265 JAMA 2541-2544 (1991).
20. LYKE, supra note 15, at 7. Prior to 1954, the IRS had recognized that employer
payments for individual coverage were taxable against the employee as part of the
employee's AGI. Id. at 8.
21. The regulatory rulings and case law prior to the enactment of section 106 offer
conflicting treatment ofemployer-provided health benefits. See Employer Health or
Accident Plans: Taxfree Protection and Proceeds, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 277, 277-86 (1953-
54) (discussing the pre-1954 tax treatment of employer-provided health benefits); see
also BUTLER, supra note 15, at 7.
22. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 7.
23. Richard E. Schumann, Compensation from World War II Through the Great
Society, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/
cm20030124ar04pl.htm.
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incentive to provide lucrative fringe benefits that they previously did not
offer, including health insurance, in order to entice prospective employees. 24
Following the end of World War II and the subsequent population boom,
America experienced a period of prosperity and growth that persisted into
the early 1950s.2 5 As is common during such periods, there was significant
innovation and advancement in various industries, such as medicine and
modem health insurance. 26 The discovery of penicillin and other medical
innovations caused the effectiveness of medical treatment to rise
exponentially.27 But as treatment effectiveness rose, so too did the consumer
demand for such services, which increased the costs of health care to such a
degree that only a minority of Americans could survive a major illness
without adverse financial consequences.28 Congress, recognizing this
growing problem, made the decision to tie health insurance to employment,
and adopted section 106, which led to the proliferation of group health
insurance today. 29
Section 106(a) of the Code provides that "gross income of an employee
does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or health
plan.'o30 For example, Worker A makes $70,000 in salary, wages and other
benefits, and receives $10,000 in employer contributions to an employer-
sponsored accident or health plan. Worker B's company does not offer an
employer-sponsored accident or health plan and instead pays him $80,000 in
24. Id.
25. Robert B. Helms, The Tax Treatment ofHealth Insurance: Early History and
Evidence 1940-1970, in EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX REFORM
4 (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., 1999).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id at 8-9.
28. Id at 9. While the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid has helped to soften
the impact on the elderly and the indigent, these programs only do so much for the
majority of Americans and their long-term viability is far from settled. See generally
Barbara S. Kleese, Christian J. Wolfe, & Catherine A. Curtis, BriefSummaries of
Medicare & Medicaid, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Nov. 1, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/
MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries20 10.pdf
(providing brief summaries about Medicare and Medicaid).
29. 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006).
30. Id
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salary, wages and others benefits so that he may purchase his $10,000 health
insurance plan on the individual market. Assuming both workers have a
marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent, section 106(a) would allow Worker
A to save $3,500 in after-tax income as compared to Worker B.3
Employer-provided health insurance enjoys preferential treatment not
only with income taxes, but also with respect to payroll taxes associated with
Medicare, Social Security and federal unemployment benefits.32 Sections
3121(a)(2) and 3306(b)(2) of the Code provide that employer contributions
to an employer-provided health plan are exempt from the collection of these
taxes.33 However, preferential treatment for payroll taxes is not available to
workers who do not receive health insurance through their employer. For
example, self-employed individuals are allowed to exclude the amount of
their contribution to a health plan, subject to some limitations, but are not
allowed to exclude these amounts from their payment of the self-
employment tax (the self-employed individual's equivalent to payroll
taxes).
B. Rationales Advanced for Preferential Treatment
Section 106, like many other provisions in the Code, provides an example
of a tax expenditure. Tax expenditures occur when the government deviates
from its normal income tax structure in order to favor a particular industry or
activity it deems beneficial to society as a whole. In this case, the
government declines to treat employer-provided health insurance as it does
36
other sources of income, in addition to other examples of employer-
31. Worker A has a federal tax liability of $24,500, leaving him with $45,500 in after
tax dollars. Worker B has a federal tax liability of $28,000, leaving him with $52,000 in
after tax dollars. However, because B must purchase his insurance on the individual
market, after deducting $10,000 for health insurance, Worker B now only has $42,000 in
after tax dollars. This scenario results in $3,500 in after tax savings for Worker A.
32. LYKE, supra note 15, at 3-4.
33. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(a)(2), 3306(b)(2) (2006).
34. 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(1), 1401 (2006).
35. Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 53 NAT'L
TAX J. 613, 613-28 (Sept. 2003), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/lJploadedPDF/410813
NTATaxExpenditure.pdf.
36. "[Giross income means all income from whatever source derived." 26 U.S.C. §
61 (2006). It is hard to argue that contributions by an employer to accident and health
plans for the employee would not constitute a fringe benefit under § 61 (a)(1).
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provided fringe benefits. 37  Congress has chosen this tax expenditure in
order to incentivize employers' purchase of private insurance for
employees.38
There are many possible reasons why the federal government would want
employers to purchase private insurance for their employees. One such
reason is to decrease its own expenditures and liabilities in health care
costs.39 The total federal, state and local expenditures on health care are
expected to reach $1.33 trillion in 2011,40 and the rising cost of health care
will only exacerbate the situation.4' In addition, private insurance also
prevents taxpayers from being forced into poverty in the event of
37. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-B: EMPLOYER'S TAX
GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p I5b/
index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (discussing the tax treatment of many other
employer-provided fringe benefits).
38. Some have argued that without government intervention in the insurance markets
and the related tax subsidies for employer-provided health insurance, many employers
would forgo covering their employees and many more uninsured would exist today. See
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE 11-16 (1994), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoes/95xx/doc9527/1994_03
TaxTreatmentOflnsurance.pdf.
39. Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax
Treatment ofEmployer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REv. 1229, 1231
(1995). Although it seems cynical, one reason the government is pursuing health care
reform is to lighten its own expenditures for health care. Politicians may focus on how
they are trying to bring down costs for the consumer, but they are also focused on the
amount of money flowing out of their purse, i.e. the Treasury. Id.
40. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES - SUMMARY 1960 TO
2007, AND PROJECTIONS 2008-2018: TABLE 127 (2010), http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/2010/tables/iOsOI27.pdf.
41. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING
1, 2 (Nov. 2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf.
Spending on health care has grown faster than the economy has grown over many years
and will result in dire budgetary consequences. According to the CBO, in 2007, total
spending on health care equaled sixteen percent of GDP, and left unchecked, would
eventually climb to twenty-five percent of GDP in 2025 and a staggering forty-nine
percent of GDP by 2082. Id. Additionally, public health expenditures are estimated to
exceed private health expenditures for the first time ever in 2011. Peter Landers, Public
Health Tab to Hit Milestone, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052748703575004575043490639289022.html.
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catastrophic illness, which would make them eligible for low-income
government health care programs and further worsen the government's
burden as it relates to health care costs.4 2
The current system has also led to employer-provided health insurance
becoming the predominant form of health insurance in America today.43
The decision to tie health insurance to employment was made in a time when
employees did not change jobs as often as they do today.44 At the time, the
link between employment and health insurance coverage served as an
effective social safety net, because employees would receive not only their
salary and wages from their employer, but their health insurance as well,
ensuring the basic needs of security and health care for a majority of
Americans. This would "lighten the load" on federal and state governments
by decreasing the number of people dependent on social services for their
own well-being. But as the American economy shifted to the global
economy we have today, the need for this safety net has dissipated, and the
need to tie health care to employment has vanished.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT EXCLUSION
Although there are some plausible rationales for and benefits of the
current exclusion for employer-provided health insurance,45 there are also a
number of important criticisms of the exclusion. Given the rapidly
exploding costs of health care in America today, any possible weaknesses of
the current system need to be evaluated in order to determine if
inefficiencies can be identified and eliminated to make the system more
efficient and cost-effective.
42. Joondeph, supra note 39, at 1236-1239.
43. INCOME, POVERTY, supra note 7.
44. Though no longitudinal survey has studied workers over their entire working
lives, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 studied the number ofjobs some
baby boomers (those born from 1957 to 1964) held from age eighteen to forty-four and
determined that the average number ofjobs held by this group was eleven per person.
Press Release, Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, & Earnings Growth Among
the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results From a Longitudinal Survey, Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
nlsoy.pdf.
45. See supra Section II.B.
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A. Loss ofRevenue
The greatest criticism, and the one most pertinent to this topic due to the
enormous costs of the ACA 46 and the current concerns about the budget
deficit,47 is the vast amount of revenue that the current exclusion costs the
Treasury each year.48 In 2011, the tax expenditure of the employer-provided
health insurance exclusion is estimated to cost the Treasury $177 billion in
lost revenue. 49 This expenditure is the greatest source of revenue loss for the
Treasury, and is nearly twice the size of the expenditure related to the
employment-based retirement plans.5 0  Furthermore, the exclusion is
estimated to cost the Treasury over $1 trillion over the years 2011 to 2015.51
Given the staggering sums of money involved, it is easy to see why some
people have targeted the exclusion for employer-provided health care as a
potential source of funding for other provisions of the ACA or for deficit
46. The Congressional Budget Office has determined that although the ACA would
cost nearly $940 billion to implement over the next decade, because of cost-saving
measures and revenue raised from other provisions, the ACA would actually reduce the
deficit during this same period. Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill 101: Who Will Pay
for Reform?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Politics/2010/0321/Health-care-reform-bill-101-Who-will-pay-for-reform. This view is
not shared by all economists though. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the
Congressional Budget Office, has written that if all of the budgetary tricks and gimmicks
are stripped away from the bill, the bill will actually increase the budget deficit by $562
billion over the next decade. Douglas Hotlz-Eakin, The Real Arithmetic ofHealth Care
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/opinion/
21holtz-eakin.html?_r-1.
47. With the current deficit standing at $14 trillion, every American citizen's share
now stands at over $45,000. Ed Hall, US. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/
debt-clock/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). This has caused politicians from both parties to
call our debt "unsustainable" and a threat to our future viability as a country. See Lori
Montgomery, White House, Democratic Lawmakers Cut Deal On Deficit Commission,
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/01/19/AR2010011903310.html.
48. CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., supra note 15.
49. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TAX EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS:
ESTIMATES FROM THE FY 2011 BUDGET 1 (Mar. 2010), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
publications/facts/FS-209Marl0_Bens-Rev-Loss.pdf.
50. Id.
5 1. Id.
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reduction. With the costs of full implementation of the ACA estimated
around $562 billion, 52 and given our precarious deficit situation, 53 all
potential revenue sources must be explored for their practical and political
feasibility.
B. Job Lock
Although there may be benefits to tying employment to health
insurance, 54 the freedom to seek alternative employment is not one of
them.55 Job lock is defined as the phenomenon where employees who would
otherwise leave a job and seek alternative employment do not do so for the
sole reason that they fear losing their existing employer-provided health
insurance. 56 The employees most susceptible to job lock are those with
preexisting conditions, who justifiably fear that their conditions will provide
the basis for denial of coverage under a new employer's plan, or will force
them to pay outrageously high premiums under a plan purchased in the
individual market.57  Empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that
employees who suffer under this phenomenon are often less happy, less
mobile, less secure, and less productive in their work.
Job lock is an especially important concern in the context of small
businesses. Nearly one-third of employers with less than one hundred
52. A Better Health Care Reform, THE NEW PROGRESSIVE, http://www.etl964.com/
?p=371 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
53. Hall, supra note 47.
54. Including pooling risks and reducing administrative expenses. See generally
Brigitte C. Madrian, Employment Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There
Evidence ofJob Lock?, 109 Q.J. EcoN. 27, 27-54 (Feb. 1994).
55. Id.
56. Cannon, supra note 12, at 144. If the employee were to move to a different job
that did not offer coverage or the level of coverage necessary, that person could always
purchase coverage on the individual market. But the inherent tax penalty in doing this
discourages many employees from pursuing this option and causes them to stay in an
unhappy, less productive work environment rather than risk the economic consequences
such a move would entail. Id.
57. Madrian, supra note 54.
58. Jason Furman, Health Reform Through Tax Reform: A Primer, 27 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 622, 623 (2008).
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employees do not offer health insurance to their employees due to the
exponentially high cost of insurance.59  Small business employers face
higher administrative burdens and lower cost savings by insuring their
workers when compared with large employers who can offer more lucrative
benefits packages at lower cost, putting small employers at a competitive
disadvantage.6 Consequently, employees at smaller businesses are less
likely to receive health benefits from their employers than they would be at
larger firms.61
C. Inequity
Another criticism of the current exclusion for employer-provided health
insurance is that it is highly inequitable. 62 Two ineuitable features of the
current exclusion have been identified and criticized. The first inequitable
feature is that the exclusion benefits only those individuals who receive their
health insurance from their employer. 64  Although employer-provided
insurance is the most popular source of insurance today, there are still
59. Larger employers pay lower premiums for their employees as compared to small
businesses because they enjoy the benefits of risk pooling. Risk pooling lowers the cost
of insurance because the risk of liability to the insurance company is spread across a
broad spectrum of employees, including both young, healthy employees (who offer a low
risk to insurance companies) and older, sicker employees (who offer a greater risk).
See,e.g., What is a Risk Pool, NAT'L Ass'N STATE COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INS. PLANS,
http://www.naschip.org/what-is-a_ riskjpool.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2011); see also
Amy B. Monohan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A Response to
Professor David Hyman, 14 CONN. INSURANCE L.J. 325, 326-28 (2008); Joondeph, supra
note 39, at 1249 (internal citations omitted).
60. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 8.
61. Id. An annual survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health
Research and Education Trust found that, "only 48 percent of firms with 3 to 9
employees, and 73 percent of firms with 10 to 24 employees, offered coverage at all,
compared with 98 percent of firms employing 200 or more" who offer coverage. Id at 9.
62. Id. at 9. See also STAN DORN, URBAN INST., CAPPING THE TAX EXCLUSION OF
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: Is EQUITY FEASIBLE? 1-4 (June 2009),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411894 cappingthetaxexclusion.pdf. See generally
Janene R. Finley and Amanda M. Grossman, Equity in Reforming the Tax Treatment of
Health Insurance Premiums, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (2009).
63. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 9.
64. Id.; see also supra discussion in Section II.A.
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millions of working families, who work for small businesses that do not
offer health insurance, as well as many self-employed individuals who lack
health insurance.65 Because many employers do not provide health
insurance, these individuals must pay for their insurance through the
individual market with after-tax dollars that have already been subjected to
high marginal federal and state taxes.66 The ACA does not resolve this
inequity, because policies purchased on the insurance exchanges created by
the law will continue to be purchased with after-tax dollars. 67 An equitable
tax system should treat similarly-situated individuals the same with respect
to their tax liability and not create preferential treatment for some taxpayers
based upon a minor distinction such as how they receive their health care.
The second inequitable feature is that the exclusion benefits affluent
taxpayers to a greater extent than it does those in the middle- and lower-
income tax brackets.69  For example, 26.7 percent of the total federal
expenditures for health benefits in 2004 went to the fourteen percent of
households making over $100,000 a year.70  Jason Furman, a renowned
65. INCOME, POVERTY, supra note 7, at 19-20. In fact, only 48.4 percent of
employees in firms with ten or fewer employees had health insurance coverage provided
by their employers as well as only 50 percent of self-employed households. BUTLER,
supra note 15, at 8-9.
66. Cannon, supra note 12, at 142.
67. Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges - Key Link in a Better- Value Chain,
NEW ENG. J. MED. (May 12, 2010), http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=3438.
Though low-income individuals will receive tax credits in order to defray some of the
impact of the mandate created by the ACA that all individuals have either public or
private insurance, this does not change the fact that whatever portion the credits fail to
cover will be paid for with after-tax dollars.
68. LYKE, supra note 15, at 17-21. Horizontal equity is concerned with treating
similarly-situated individuals in the same manner. Vertical equity is concerned with
apportioning the benefits of a tax policy to those who need them most and shifting the
burdens to those who can more easily handle them. See Joseph J. Cordes, Horizontal
Equity, in ENCYC. OF TAXATION & TAx POL'Y 195-96 (1999), http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/UploadedPDF/1 000533.pdf (discussing horizontal equity).
69. CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
70. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Tax
Employer-Paid Health Insurance, NEw ENG. J. MED., (Aug. 19, 2009), http://
healthcarereform.nejm.org/?p=1521.
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health care economist and Deputy Director of President Obama's National
Economic Council, illustrates how the value of the exclusion for a $10,000
policy changes with an employee's marginal tax rate:
For example, consider an employer contributing $8,000 for a family
policy and requiring the worker to contribute $2,000. A low-income
worker facing a marginal tax rate of 10 percent . . . would effectively
have to give up $9,200 in after-tax income for this policy - effectively
an 8 percent subsidy for insurance. In contrast, a high-income family
might be in the 40 percent marginal rate and thus have to give up
$6,800 in after tax-income for this policy - effectively a 32 percent
subsidy for insurance.71
Health economists from across the political spectrum agree that the
72
existing system of tax subsidies is highly regressive. A progressive tax
system would provide the greatest benefits to those who need it most, and as
a result, subsidies should taper down as income rises. 7 3 Not only does the
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance benefit those taxpayers in
the higher tax brackets more than those in middle- and lower-income
brackets, but it also encourages those in the higher tax brackets to retain the
most generous insurance coverage, which is a driving force behind the rising
74
costs of health care.
71. Furman, supra note 58, at 624 (internal citations omitted).
72. However, others counter that this system is truly progressive, collecting a larger
percentage of income from wealthy families than low-income families, and that
confusion arises only because of the staggering sums of money at stake. See
Himmelstein & Woolhandler, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Fin. Comm., Baucus, Grassley Release Policy
Options for Financing Comprehensive Health Care Reform (May 11, 2009), http://
www.npaihb.org/images/policy docs/healthrefonn/2009/Roundtable/Tab%203/
Expanding%20Health%2OCare%20Coverage%20Press%20Release.pdf While there are
many factors involved in the rising cost of health care, the issuance of high-deductible
plans that hide the true cost of health care has been singled out by Senators Baucus and
Grassley as the driving force behind the rising costs. Id. Others have pointed to
prescription drug costs, program administration, and labor compensation as the driving
forces behind rising health care costs. See Dustin Chambers, What Is Driving Rising
Healthcare Costs?, THE AMERICAN (May 18, 2009), http://www.american.com/archive/
2009/may-2009/what-is-driving-rising-healthcare-costs.
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D. Excess Insurance
Another criticism of the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance
contributions from an employee's AGI is that this system leads to excess
insurance and, accordingly, drives up health care costs.75 Because over sixty
percent of individuals receive their health insurance through their
employers,76 many Americans are insulated from the true cost of health care
since their employers make contributions on their behalf.7 7 Many employees
do not realize that employers purchase insurance for its employees not out of
benevolence or compassion, but because this allows them to reduce
employee wages and salaries or reduce full-time staff.78  This lack of
transparency encourages employees to negotiate for plans with benefits they
neither need nor desire, but accept nonetheless, simply because they are
available. 79  The ACA attempts to combat this problem by requiring
employers to report the value of their contributions to the employees' health
insurance on each employee's W-2, seemingly making the cost of health
care more transparent. However, because this reporting is for
informational purposes only and there is no tax liability associated with the
value of the plan, it is doubtful that this will do much to curb incidences of
excess insurance.81
The problem of excess insurance is especially acute when dealing with
insurance plans with low deductibles and co-payments.82 These features
75. LYKE, supra note 15, at 12. See also Ronald J. Vogel, The Tax Treatment of
Health Insurance Premiums as a Cause of Overinsurance, in NAT'L HEALTH INSURANCE:
WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? 220, 231-232 (Mark V. Pauly ed., 1980).
76. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 5.
77. Cannon, supra note 12, at 143-44.
78. Id. at 142. Survey of health economists by Michael Morrisey and John Cawley
found that ninety-one percent agree that health benefits are derived from a reduction in an
employee's wages or salary. Id.
79. CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., supra note 15, at 2.
80. Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id= 220809,00.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
8 1. Id.
82. LYKE, supra note 15, at 12. Some economists consider the proliferation of
excess insurance a welfare or efficiency loss for society as a whole because of the
wasteful and counter-productive consequences that flow from having such policies. For
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further hide the true cost of health care from the consumer and, accordingly,
83drive up the cost of health care. As costs associated with health care rise,
demand for these low deductible and co-payment plans also rises because it
encourages people to purchase more insurance than the y need in order to
avoid the financial risk of increased health care costs.8 Accordingly, an
uncapped exclusion coupled with the rising cost of health care in general
incentivizes employees to procure excess insurance.85
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE CURRENT EXCLUSION
A variety of proposals have been offered to reform the current exclusion
for employer-provided health care. These proposals range from repealing
the current exclusion outright to leaving the current system largely in place
and creating additional tax incentives that seek to bring down overall health
care costs without imposing too much of a burden on the middle class. Each
of these proposals will be evaluated to determine whether they address the
criticisms and weaknesses of the current system.
A. Repeal
A proposal for the repeal of the exclusion for employer-provided health
insurance is appealing in theory, but difficult to implement in practice.86
The proposal is relatively straightforward: repeal the exclusion for
employer-provided health insurance and require employees to include
employer-provided contributions to accident and health plans in their AGI.
example, Martin Feldstein, a renowned economist, conducted a study that concluded that
the welfare loss associated with excess insurance could have been as much as 109 billion
dollars in 1984. Id. (internal citations omitted). With the skyrocketing costs of health
insurance since 1984, it is safe to say that this welfare loss is much greater now. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Cannon, supra note 12, at 145. As with many issues in Washington, incremental
change is often the easiest way to get things accomplished. Stuart Butler says, "[i]n the
health insurance domain, it is important to introduce change gradually, so that people
with coverage can adapt." BUTLER, supra note 15, at 12. This is especially pertinent
when speaking of repeal, because repeal would effectively change the tax liability of over
180 million Americans, something that should not be done overnight. Cannon, supra
note 12, at 148.
87. Cannon, supra note 12, at 145.
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This solution would address the chief criticism of lost revenue, and allow the
resulting $177 billion per year in revenue to flow to the U.S. Treasury.8 In
addition, repeal of the exclusion would address the inequities in the current
system by abolishing the preferential treatment employer-provided health
insurance enjoys and the concurrent benefits bestowed upon affluent
taxpayers. Repeal would also reduce the incidence of job lock; employees
would no longer have the structural incentive to receive their health
insurance through their employers and would thus be enabled to seek
alternative employment if and when desired.
However, political and practical realities make repeal of the exclusion
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.90 To remove or repeal a tax
subsidy is effectively to tax something that was previously untaxed.91
Because over 180 million Americans receive their health insurance through
their employers, repeal of the exclusion would effectively raise taxes on
these 180 million Americans, many of whom are middle- and lower-income
workers.92 Despite the negative consequences associated with the current
system, a tax increase on nearly half of all Americans, without measures to
mitigate the impact on middle- and lower-income workers, would be far
more inequitable.
Senator John McCain, in his campaign for president in 2008, proposed
repealing the current exclusion, but advocated including tax credits to soften
the tax "bite" on the middle- and lower-income families who would be
affected by such repeal.93 Similarly, Michael F. Cannon, a renowned health
policy analyst and former health policy director for the Senate Republican
Policy Committee,9 4 has proposed repealing the exclusion while
simultaneously reducing payroll and income tax rates to ease the burden of
88. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 49, at 1.
89. Cannon, supra note 12, at 144.
90. Id. at 145.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 145,148.
93. Kevin Sack & Michael Cooper, McCain Health Plan Could Mean Higher Tax,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/01/us/politics/
01mccain.html.
94. Michael F. Cannon, CATO INST.: POLICY SCHOLARS, http://www.cato.org/
people/michael-cannon (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
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repeal.95 While these proposals have merit, they also demonstrate that repeal
96
of the exclusion alone will never be pursued as a reform option. The
political reality is that any repeal proposal must be coupled with new tax
incentives to soften the blow on American taxpayers. 97 But creating new tax
incentives reduces some of the incoming revenue freed by the exclusion and
creates an illogical proposal Jason Furman dubbed "two wrongs make a
right."98 This is why many of the proposals now offered focus on capping
the exclusion rather than outright repealing it.
B. Capping the Exclusion Based on Income or the Value of the Plan
Offered
One alternative to outright repeal of the exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance is to cap the exclusion based on the income of the taxpayer
or the value of the plan being offered, or some combination of the two.99
This proposal would set a base level of income, whereby individuals with
income in excess of this level would not be permitted by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to exclude employer-provided health insurance from
their AGI.o Similarly, if the proposal were based on the value of the
insurance plan offered, employee plans with values in excess of the
95. Cannon, supra note 12, at 145.
96. Id. While anything is technically legislatively possible, American's polarized
political system, aversion to radical change, and preference for incremental change makes
this proposal as close to a nonstarter as possible. See id.
97. Id This is why Cannon proposed repealing the exclusion coupled with a
reduction in payroll taxes because it would soften the bite of such a proposal (much like
Senator McCain attempts to couple his repeal proposal with credits to soften the blow on
lower- and middle-income families that would be affected by such a proposal). Id.; Sack
& Cooper, supra note 93.
98. Furman, supra note 58, at 628. It makes little sense to eliminate one tax subsidy
and then use another subsidy to soften the bite of repealing the first subsidy if one of the
major reasons for eliminating the subsidy in the first place is to generate revenue.
99. CLEMANS-COPE ETAL., supra note 15, at 2-3; see also Blaine G. Saito, The Value
ofHealth and Wealth: Economic Theory, Administration, and Valuation Methods For
Capping the Employer Sponsored Insurance Tax Exemption, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235
(2011) (discussing in great detail the various methods for determining the proper level of
the cap on the exclusion, and ultimately determining that a cap based on actuarial
valuation is the best method for determining the proper level for the cap).
100. Id. at 3.
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threshold would add the value in excess to their AGI for income and payroll
tax computation.'o0
Most proposals involve some combination of both income and plan value
because of inherent weaknesses in capping only one or the other. For
example, while a cap based on income would ensure that the middle- and
lower-income families do not face a tax increase, it also limits the amount of
revenue that the government can raise, because there are only so many
"rich" people to tax.102 Similarly, a cap based on plan value would reach not
only the corporate titans and their "Cadillac" insurance plans, 03 but also
union employees who negotiated for greater health benefits at the expense of
increases in wages or salary.'0 In addition, the index chosen by the IRS,
which determines the rate at which the cap is calculated to grow, can greatly
impact the amount of revenue collected and number of taxpayers affected.
Despite difficulties in ascertaining the initial levels for capping the
exclusion and for determining the proper index rate at which the cap will
grow, this proposal addresses many of the criticisms of the current system
with few drawbacks.o A study by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
demonstrates that capping the exclusion can raise considerable amounts of
revenue as a potential source of funding for comprehensive health care
101. Id.
102. Current proposals in the House of Representatives would tax millionaires in an
effort to fund health care reform. See Timothy Noah, Health Reform Winners and
Losers, SLATE, (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2231641/. In addition to the lack
of millionaires to tax under such a proposal, there are arguments that taxing the
productive and successful members of society will provide a disincentive for some to be
as productive as possible in order to avoid being placed into that higher tax bracket. See
generally, TAX JUSTICE: AN ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry,
Jr. eds., 2002) (discussing the merits of proposals of taxes focusing on higher earners).
103. Leslie Wayne & David M. Herszenhorn, A Bid to Tax Health Benefits of
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A15. Certain executives at Goldman Sachs
lavished themselves and their dependents with health insurance policies valued in excess
of $40,000. Id.
104. Tim Fernholz, What Max Baucus Can Learn From the Labor Movement, AM.
PROSPECT (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=whatmax
baucus can learn from the labor movement.
105. CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
106. Id.
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reform.10 7 For example, the most conservative policy option used in the
study - capping the exclusion at the seventy-fifth percentile of insurance
premiums and indexing by the rate of growth of medical expenses - would
generate $62 billion in new revenue over ten years. os While this does not
approach the trillions that repeal of the exclusion would raise over the same
ten-year period, it is a step in the right direction: it avoids the tax shock on
middle-class Americans. Furthermore, variations to the cap or index can
raise substantially more revenue, though changing these options will also
increase the number of households affected by the resulting tax increases.' 0 9
In addition to recapturing some of the lost revenue from the exclusion, a
cap would also reduce the inequities in the current system."o Capping
based on both income and plan value would target the exclusion to those
who currently lack access to affordable health insurance, instead of broadly
including the affluent, who are in a better position to afford the increasing
costs of insurance without subsidies." Capping the exclusion would also
create more equity between employer- rovided health care and other forms
of employer-provided fringe benefits. 2 For example, employer-provided
contributions to retirement plans, meals, education benefits, and child-care
are already capped at various levels, limiting the benefits to those in need of
107. Id. at 3, 4.
108. Id.
109. For example, the option described - capping based on the seventy-fifth percentile
of insurance premiums and indexing on the growth rate of medical expenses - would
raise taxes for only fourteen percent of taxpayers. Simply changing to a different index,
such as an index based on GDP, would generate over $224 billion in revenue, but would
raise taxes on forty percent of taxpayers. Id. at 5. The Laffer Curve, articulated by
economist Arthur Laffer in the 1980s, is an economic theory by which increasing taxation
to a certain rate raises less revenue than keeping low rates or even lowering effective tax
rates. When selecting an appropriate level of taxation for employer-provided health
insurance plans, careful consideration of the Laffer Curve will need to take place to
ensure that as much revenue can be generated as possible. For a detailed discussion of
the Laffer Curve, see Zsolt Becsi, The Shifty Laffer Curve, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA EcoNoMIc REVIEw 53-64 (3d Q. 2000), http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacy
docs/ becsi.pdf.
110. See supra Section II.C.
111. No one can plausibly claim that the affluent face a problem with affordable
access to health insurance coverage and should be expected to shoulder their own
medical care burden if able.
112. See ROFFENBENDER, supra note 15, at 2-3.
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financial assistance." 3 Accordingly, capping the insurance exclusion would
be in line with other capped contributions.
Capping the exclusion would also address the issue of excess insurance by
removing any current incentive to purchase more insurance than is
necessary.114 By making employees with high-cost plans subject to new tax
liability, a cap would make consumers aware of the true cost of their health
insurance plans and spur them into making health care and insurance
decisions based on the economic realities of their situations.' 15 Employees
with high-cost plans would have to decide whether they enjoy their existing
benefits enough to justify the added tax liability, or whether they would
prefer insurance plans that do not exceed the cap. If they choose the latter,
this would lead to increased savings on health care costs overall through
increased cost efficiency.
C. The Affordable Care Act and the Excise Tax
The Affordable Care Act seeks to raise the revenue necessary for
implementation using an excise tax levied on insurance companies for any
health plan above $10,200 for individuals and $27,500 for families. 11 6 This
proposal is similar to a cap on the exclusion based on the value of the
employee's insurance plan, but with some marked differences. Whereas a
cap on the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance would raise the
tax liability of the individual employee through a higher AGI, the excise tax
targets insurance companies themselves.1 17 However, economists agree that
any excise tax levied against insurance companies will be passed on to the
consumers in the form of higher premiums.1 Although this proposal would
address the high-cost insurance plans that lead to increased overall health
costs, it fails to address some of the other key concerns involving the current
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance.
113. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv.,supra note 37.
114. See supra Section III.D.
115. Vogel, supra note 75, at 231-233.
116. Summary ofNew Health Reform Law, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3 (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
117. Id.
118. As with many excise taxes, the tax will undoubtedly raise premiums for
consumers, much like they do for gasoline and cigarettes. Kevin Hassett, Obamacare
Tax Frays Middle-Class Vow, BLOOMBERG NEws (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a2dK9UZuFSxQ.
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First, the excise tax fails to sever the bond between employment and
health insurance that leads to job lock."' 9 Because this proposal does not
alter the preferential treatment that employer-provided health insurance
enjoys, employees who receive their health insurance through their
employers will continue to feel compelled to keep their jobs in order to
maintain their insurance, rather than risk paying higher premiums on the
individual market.120 Although individuals will be permitted to purchase
insurance on the exchanges created by the ACA, this insurance will still be
purchased using after-tax dollars as opposed to the pre-tax dollars that
employer-provided plans receive.'21
Further, the excise tax does not address the inequities of employer-
provided health insurance, and in fact creates new inequities. Consider the
following example: Worker A is a union employee who receives a salary of
$60,000 in addition to a $10,000 contribution to his $12,700 insurance plan.
Worker B is a hedge fund manager who receives a salary of $500,000 and a
$10,000 contribution to his $12,700 insurance plan. Under the excise tax,
both insurance companies would be taxed on the $2,500 excess in these
plans. When both insurance companies inevitably raise their premiums to
account for the excise tax, assuming the employer contribution stays the
same, both Worker A and Worker B would need to make additional
contributions in order to retain the same policy. However, Worker B will be
in a better position than Worker A to account for the inevitable increase in
premiums that would result because of Worker B's higher salary. While it
seems that this excise tax would affect each worker equally, the reality is
that those lower- and middle-income families who either negotiated for
greater health benefits at the expense of higher wages or who require high-
cost plans because of their own pre-existing conditions would be adversely
119. See supra Section IlI.B.
120. Madrian, supra note 54.
121. Summary ofNew Health Reform Law, supra note 116, at 1-5.
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affected by such a proposal.122 In fact, some have argued that an excise tax
like this will inevitably raise some individuals' premiums. 12 3
Additionally, this proposal does not create the transparency that
consumers need to address the problem of excess insurance and make
educated decisions that will help decrease overall costs. Although
employers are required to report the amount of their contribution on the
employees' W-2s beginning in 2011, there is no guarantee that consumers
will use this information to begin to make more informed health care
decisions.' 24 In fact, use of an excise tax levied on insurance companies
may further conceal the true cost of health care from consumers because it
continues to mask the true cost of comprehensive health care reform.125 if
taxpayers believe that the government can achieve cost savings and
universal coverage for the uninsured without some reduction in the level of
service or the amount of taxes that will need to be collected for such an
122. See Steve Early & Rand Wilson, Why the Health Insurance Excise Tax is a Bad
Idea, THE NATION (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-health-
insurance-excise-tax-bad-idea (citing opposition to the excise tax by unions); Mike Hall,
Proposed Health Care 'Excise Tax' a Tax on the Middle Class, AFL-CIO NOW BLOG
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://blog.aflcio.org/2009/10/15/proposed-health-care-excise-tax-a-tax-
on-the-middle-class/.
123. The CBO, commenting on an earlier version of the excise tax contained in a
Senate version of the bill, noted that individual insurance premiums could rise or fall
depending on a person's income level. Jeffrey Young, CBO: Senate Bill Would Increase
Individual Insurance Premiums, THE HILL (Nov. 30, 2009), http://thehill.com/homenews/
senate/69763-cbo-report-predicts-increases-in-insurance-premiums. Premium increases
are being reported throughout the country, but the reasons behind the increases are not
readily apparent. Some argue that the ACA, and its numerous patient protections and
mandates that certain procedures be covered by all policies, are the reason for these
increases. Others argue that because many of the provisions of the ACA are not in place
yet, insurance companies are raising premiums now before many of the patient
protections against such rate increases are put into place. See Jonathan Kolstad & Neeraj
Sood, Rising Individual Market Premiums: Two Competing Narratives, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/03/12/rising-individual-market-
premiums-two-competing-narratives/.
124. Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, supra note 80.
125. Critics of the ACA contend that many of the cost containment mechanisms and
savings are a result of budget and accounting gimmicks that will never materialize.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Joseph Antos & James C. Capretta, Health Care Repeal Won't Add
to the Deficit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
527487039540045760897023542921 00.html.
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endeavor, then they will never begin to make the informed medical decisions
necessary to drive down wasteful procedures and health care costs.
D. Tax Credits are not a Viable Alternative to Changing the Exclusion for
Employer-provided Health Insurance
Tax credits, exclusive of re-evaluating the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance, have been offered as a means of funding the
implementation of the ACA or for deficit reduction purposes.126 Although
tax credits would address some criticisms of the current preferential
treatment of employer-provided health insurance, tax credits are not without
their own inherent weaknesses that must be explored.
For example, the Senate Finance Committee proposed offering Health
Care Affordability Credits for lower-income families between 100 percent
and 400 percent of the poverty line.127 These credits would be refundable,
meaning that if the credit provided to the individual were in excess of the
cost of insurance, the excess could be used to reduce other tax liability or be
returned to the taxpayer in the form of a tax refund.128 If the credits were not
refundable, they would fail to assist the millions of lower and middle-
income families who have no federal tax liability in purchasing health
insurance.129 The credits would also be "advanceable," meaning the credit
would be available throughout the year rather than at the end of the tax
year. 130 If the credits were not advanceable, many low-income families
would face a liquidity problem when their premiums became due, and likely
be unable to pay.131
126. Press Release, supra note 74.
127. Id. at 3.
128. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 22 (discussing a plan by Stuart Butler similar to the
one put forward by Baucus and Grasserly, utilizing tax credits to soften the impact on the
middle class of any changes to the employer-provided health insurance system).
129. Id. Recent reports state that nearly half of all households have no federal tax
liability on a yearly basis. Stephen Ohlemacher, Nearly HalfofUS Households Escape
Fed Income Tax, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 7, 2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
Nearly-half-of-US-households-apf- 11 05567323.html?x=0&.v-1l.
130. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 22.
131. Id. Liquidity problems can serve as the justification for refusing or deferring to
collect a taxable amount. Advanceable credits will simplify the tax treatment of these
credits. Id.
2011 421
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVII:2
While the Committee's proposal would help to solve some of the
problems associated with Americans' inabilities to purchase health
insurance, the tax credits raise more issues than they solve. For example,
offering tax credits would effectively sever the tie between employment and
health insurance that causes job lock; however, the credits would not address
the loss of revenue associated with the current exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance.132 In fact, like tax expenditures, tax credits are
not free, and without some other revenue source to finance tax credits, they
would leave the budget deficit in more dire circumstances than currently
exist.'33 Similarly, while the tax credits would address the inequity of the
current system that affords affluent taxpayers a greater benefit than lower-
income taxpayers, credits would leave in place the systemic inequities
employer- rovided health insurance enjoys over other types of insurance and
benefits. 13 Accordingly, proposals focusing on tax credits generally couple
some cap or repeal of the exclusion as a possible way to finance tax credits
for the purchase of health insurance. 3 5
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of Section 106 of the Code and the incentives created by this
tax expenditure, employer-provided health insurance has dominated the
private insurance market for the past fifty years.136 However, thejustifications underlying the decision to tie employment to health insurance
132. Any proposal that does not change the current treatment of employer-provided
health insurance will not be able to recover the lost revenue. Id.
133. The budget deficit for fiscal year 2010 was $1.29 trillion, lower than many
forecasters predicted, but still the second highest annual budget deficit in history. Joseph
Lazzaro, 2010 Budget Deficit Comes in Below Expectations - but Still Second-Highest
Ever, AOL (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/taxes/federal-budget-
deficit-below-expectations/19675849/. The interest paid on Treasury backed securities in
2010 totaled $24.1 billion. FIN. MGMT SERv., U.S. TREASURY, MONTHLY TREASURY
STATEMENT (Oct. 2010), http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/mts1010.pdf.
134. See infra Section IlI.C.
135. Cannon, supra note 12. See also LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLOHAN, URBAN
INST., AN ANALYSIS OF THE MCCAiN HEALTH CARE PROPOSAL (2008), http://www.urban.
orgfUploadedPDF/411755 mccain health_proposal.pdf (discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of the McCain campaign proposals for health care reform, including the
repeal of the current tax treatment and credits).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006); BUTLER, supra note 15, at 7.
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no longer exist.'37 Worker mobility in today's global economy is in direct
conflict with the security of tying health insurance to the employer that was
a justification for the current treatment. The criticisms of the current
treatment of employer-provided health insurance, including that it is
inequitable, loses revenue, and leads to job lock and excess insurance, all
point to fundamental weaknesses that need to be corrected.
To address many of the problems of the current tax treatment of
employer-provided health insurance, Congress should amend section 106 to
cap the limit of the exclusion based on both the employee's income and the
value of the insurance plan offered. This would accomplish the dual
objectives of bringing overall health care costs down and providing the
necessary revenue to finance other necessary elements of any reform bill,
whether it is the ACA or some alternative. 3 Health care costs would
decrease because the cap would deter the issuance of "gold-plated"
insurance plans that drive up overall health care costs, including low
deductible and co-payment plans that hide the true cost of health care to
many consumers.14 Moreover, a cap based on income and plan value could
raise significant amounts of revenue currently lost by the Treasury, which
could be used to finance other components of comprehensive health reform,
such as decreasing the number of uninsured, providing necessary patient
protections and bending the cost curve of health care that threatens this
country's long-term solubility.141
137. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 7-10.
138. Id at 8. American workers today change jobs more frequently than they did in
1954. For example, "in 1983 almost two-thirds of men in their fifties had spent ten or
more years with the same employer, by 2004 that fraction had fallen to just over half."
Id. at 7-8.
139. See Furman, supra note 58, at 622; CLEMANS-COPE ET AL., supra note 15, at 1-4.
140. Wayne & Herszenhorn, supra note 103.
141. While the overall popularity of the ACA is difficult to gauge, the patient
protections contained therein have consistently polled very well with the public and any
effort to repeal the ACA should be coupled with a bill replacing these popular
protections, including the abolishment of lifetime limits on coverage and denials based on
pre-existing conditions. Steven Thomma, New Poll Undercuts GOP Claims of Midterm
Mandate, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/22/
104152/poll-majority-of-americans-want.html; Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act's
New Patient's Bill ofRights, HEALTHCAREREFORM.GOv (June 22, 2010), http://www.
healthreform.gov/newsroom/newpatients bill of rights.html.
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A cap of based on income and the value of the plan would also confront
many weaknesses in the current treatment of employer-provided health
insurance. For example, in addition to generating revenue, capping the
exclusion based on income would reduce the inequity inherent in the current
exclusion because it would be properly directed at those who need the
greatest assistance acquiring access to affordable health insurance.142 A cap
based on plan value would also make the true cost of insurance transparent
and help drive down overall health care costs because consumers would
make better informed decisions about their insurance packages.143
Unfortunately, this type of cap does little to confront the problem of job lock
- an incentive would still exist for individuals to receive and retain their
health insurance through their employers.144  But other components of
comprehensive health care reform would do much to combat the current
problems associated with job lock, such as a ban on denials based on pre-
existing conditions and the creation of the insurance exchanges.145
Despite the obvious benefits a cap would offer, such a proposal will still
draw stiff political opposition. Because it seeks to limit the exclusion based
on income, higher-income workers would be subject to a tax liability to
which they previously were not. In addition, union employees, many of
them low- and middle-income workers, would fight the cap based on plan
value because of the tax liability many of them would face under this
proposal.146 But America's long-term fiscal outlook requires that proper
142. The Congressional Budget Office found that nearly twenty percent of nonelderly
families with income levels less than 200 percent below the poverty line are uninsured,
and assistance would necessarily be tied to helping those who cannot afford the rising
cost of health insurance. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How MANY PEOPLE LACK
HEALTH INSURANCE AND FOR How LONG? (May 2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
doc.cfm?index=42 10&type=0&sequence=2#t2 1.
143. As the Department of Health and Human Services acknowledged during their
Value-Driven Health Care initiative, when consumers have more information about the
price and quality of the products they buy, they make better decisions. Value-Driven
Health Care Home, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://archive.hhs.gov/
valuedriven/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
144. See supra Section III.B.
145. Summary ofNew Health Reform Law supra note 116.
146. Erica Werner, Democrats Hit New Proposed Tax on Insurance Plans,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9APAQR
02&showarticle=l. See also S.A. Miller, Teamsters Buck Senate Health Bill Over Tax,
WASH. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/
nov/19/teamsters-buck-senate-health-bill-over-tax/.
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steps be taken to correct the currently unsustainable path of health care costs
in this country. Re-evaluating and amending the current treatment of
employer-provided health insurance is a step in that direction.
